Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 7, 2019

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India upholds the constitutional validity of Section 23 and Sections 20 & 30 of the PCPNDT Act


Complete contents of Form F are mandatory

Landmark Judgment

Dr KK Aggarwal & Ira Gupta

In a landmark judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had upheld the constitutional validity of Section 23 and Section 20 & 30 of the PCPNDT Act; the complete contents of Form F are mandatory.

The medical profession has lost an important opportunity to defend penal provisions for clerical errors. Had all the medical bodies focused and fought together this may not have happened. So many doctors in the present cabinet of ministers and yet none fought at the level of parliament to resolve this issue. Penal provisions will now become a reality in all new laws unless the newly elected government decides to change this after the 23rd of May. Many think it otherwise. Supreme Court judgment is only an interpretation of the existing laws, which can only be changed by the parliament and political will. 

When I was the General Secretary and National President of IMA, I remember that the Health Ministry had agreed to take away the penal provisions for clerical errors and adopt graded punishments.  But I fail to understand what transpired FOGSI to fight alone ignoring other medical bodies. 

Let us see what the court said. 

In  the matter titled as “Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) versus Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 129 of 2017 vide judgment dated 03.05.2019 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vineet Saran it was held that no case is made out for striking down the proviso to Section 4(3), provisions of section 23(1), Section 23(2) or to read down Section 20 or 30 of the Pre- Conception and Pre Natal Diagnostics Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act). It was also held that the complete contents of “Form F” are mandatory. Thereby upholding the constitutional validity of proviso to Section 4(3), provisions of section 23(1), Section 23(2) and Form F of PCPNDT Act.

Case details

The said writ petition was filed by FOGSI highlighting the issues and problems affecting the practice of obstetricians and gynaecologists across the country under PCPNDT Act and challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 23(1) and Section 23(2) of the PCPNDT Act and seeking directions in the nature of certiorari / mandamus for decriminalising anomalies in paperwork/record keeping/clerical errors in regard to the provisions of the Act for being violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

It was contented by FOGSI that:

      i.        Equating clerical errors on the same footing with the actual offence of sex determination shows inherent weakness in the language of the Act.
     ii.        Appropriate Authority appointed under the Act conducts inspections and raids in various districts and cities even if there are mere anomalies in the paperwork, it seals the sonography machine and files a criminal case under the Act. Doctors who do not conduct sex determination and gender selection are being targeted on the basis of aforesaid anomalies.
    iii.        The Act has failed to distinguish between criminal offences and the anomalies in paperwork like incomplete ‘F’ Forms, clerical mistakes such as writing NA or incomplete address, no mentioning of the date objectionable pictures of Radha Krishna in sonography room, incomplete filling of Form ‘F’, indication for sonography not written, faded notice board and not legible, striking out details in the Form ‘F’ etc., thereby charging the members of the petitioner Society for heinous crime of female foeticide and sex determination and that too merely for unintentional mistakes in record keeping.
    iv.        The Act provides same punishment for the contravention of any provision of the Act, thus equating the anomalies in paperwork and the offence of sex determination and gender selection on the same pedestal.
     v.        Ambiguous wording of Section 23(1) of the Act has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and the members of the petitioner Society have faced grave hardships and have undergone criminal prosecution for act, which cannot be equated with the acts of sex determination.
    vi.        Section 23(2) of the Act empowers the State Medical Council to suspend the registration of any doctor indefinitely, who is reported by the Appropriate Authority for necessary action, during the pendency of trial.
   vii.        Section 23(2) of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution as it assumes the guilt of the alleged accused even before his/her conviction by a competent court and hence violates the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgement

After hearing the matter, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that:

“85. The Act is a social welfare legislation, which was conceived in light of the skewed sex ratio of India and to avoid the consequences of the same. A skewed sex ratio is likely to lead to greater incidences of violence against women and increase in practices of trafficking, ‘bride buying’ etc. The rigorous implementation of the Act is an edifice on which rests the task of saving the girl child.

86. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in our opinion, no case is made out to hold that deficiency in maintaining the record mandated by Sections 5, 6 and the proviso to Section 4(3) cannot be diluted as the aforesaid provisions have been incorporated in various columns of the Form ‘F’ and as already held that it would not be a case clerical mistake but absence of sine qua non for undertaking a diagnostic test/procedure. It cannot be said to be a case of clerical or technical lapse. Section 23(1) need not have provided for gradation of offence once offence is of non-maintenance of the record, maintenance of which itself intend to prevent female foeticide. It need not have graded offence any further difference is so blur it would not be possible to prevent crime. There need not have been any gradation of offence on the basis of actual determination of sex and non-maintenance of record as undertaking the test without the prerequisites is totally prohibited under the Act. The no maintenance of record is very foundation of offence. For first and second offences, gradation has been made which is quite reasonable.

87. Provisions of Section 23(2) has also been attacked on the ground that suspension on framing the charges should not be on the basis of clerical mistake, inadvertent clerical lapses. As we found it is not what is suggested to be clerical or technical lapse nor it can be said to be inadvertent mistakes as existence of the particular medical condition is mandated by Sections 4 and 5 including the age etc. Thus, suspension on framing of charges cannot be said to be unwarranted. The same intends to prevent mischief. We are not going into the minutes what can be treated as a simple clerical mistake that has to be seen case wise and no categorization can be made of such mistakes, if any, but with respect to what is mandatory to be provided in the Form as per provisions of various sections has to be clearly mentioned, it cannot be kept vague, obscure or blank as it is necessary for undertaking requisite tests, investigations and procedures. There are internal safeguards in the Act under the provisions relating to appeal, the Supervisory Board as well as the Appropriate Authority, its Advisory Committee and we find that the provisions cannot be said to be suffering from any vice as framing of the charges would mean prima facie case has been found by the Court and in that case, suspension cannot be said to be unwarranted.

88. It was also prayed that action should be taken under Section 20 after show cause notice and reasonable opportunity of being heard. There is already a provision in Section 20(1) to issue a show cause and in Section 20(2) contains the provision as to reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thus, we find no infirmity in the aforesaid provision. 
89. There also the Appropriate Authority to consider each case on merits with the help of Advisory Body which has legal expert. The Advisory Committee consists of one legal expert which has to aid and advise the Appropriate Authority as provided in Sections 16 and 17(5)(6). Thus, the submission that legal advice should be taken before prosecution, in view of the provisions, has no legs to stand.

90. It was also contended that action of seizure of ultrasonography machine and sealing the premises cannot be said to be appropriate. The submission is too tenuous and liable to be rejected. Section 30 of the Act enumerates the power of search and seizure and Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules provide for the power of the Appropriate Authority to seal equipment, inspect premises and conduct search and seizure. It was pointed out by the respondents that a “Standard Operational Procedure”, detailing the procedure for search and seizure has been developed by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Further, regular training of Appropriate Authorities is being carried out at both the National and State level. All the States have also been directed to develop online MIS for monitoring the implementation of the Act. It is settled proposition that when offence is found to be committed, there can be seizure and sealing of the premises and equipment during trial as no license can be given to go on committing the offence. Such provisions of seizure/sealing, pending trial are to be found invariably in various penal legislations. The impugned provisions contained in the Act constitute reasonable restrictions to carry on any profession which cannot be said to be violative of Right to Equality enshrined under Article 14 or right to practise any profession under Article 19(1)(g). Considering the Fundamental Duties under Article 51A(e) and considering that female foeticide is most inhumane act and results in reduction in sex ratio, such provisions cannot be said to be illegal and arbitrary in any manner besides there are various safeguards provided in the Act to prevent arbitrary actions as discussed above.

91. In light of the nature of offences which necessitated the enactment of the Act and the grave consequences that would ensue otherwise, suspension of registration under Section 23(2) of the Act serves as a deterrent. The individual cases cited by the petitioner Society cannot be a ground for passing blanket directions, and the individuals have remedies under the law which they can avail. Moreover, the concept of double jeopardy would have no application here, as it provides that a person shall not be convicted of the same offence twice, which is demonstrably not the case here. Suspension is a step-in-aid to further the intendment of act. It cannot be said to be double punishment. In case an employee is convicted for an offence, he cannot continue in service which can be termed to be double jeopardy.

92. Non maintenance of record is spring board for commission of offence of foeticide, not just a clerical error. In order to effectively implement the various provisions of the Act, the detailed forms in which records have to be maintained have been provided for by the Rules. These Rules are necessary for the implementation of the Act and improper maintenance of such record amounts to violation of provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, by virtue of proviso to Section 4(3) of the Act. In addition, any breach of the provisions of the Act or its Rules would attract cancellation or suspension of registration of Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic, by the Appropriate Authority as provided under Section 20 of the Act.

93. There is no substance in the submission that provision of Section 4(3) be read down. By virtue of the proviso to Section 4(3), a person conducting ultrasonography on a pregnant woman, is required to keep complete record of the same in the prescribed manner and any deficiency or inaccuracy in the same amounts to contravention of Section 5 or Section 6 of the Act, unless the contrary is proved by the person conducting the said ultrasonography. The aforementioned proviso to Section 4(3) reflects the importance of records in such cases, as they are often the only source to ensure that an establishment is not engaged in sex determination.

94. Section 23 of the Act, which provides for penalties of offences, acts in aid of the other Sections of the Act is quite reasonable. It provides for punishment for any medical geneticist, gynaecologist, registered medical practitioner or a person who owns a Genetic Counselling Centre, a Genetic Clinic or a Genetic Laboratory, and renders his professional or technical services to or at said place, whether on honorarium basis or otherwise and contravenes any provisions of the Act, or the Rules under it.

95. Therefore, dilution of the provisions of the Act or the Rules would only defeat the purpose of the Act to prevent female foeticide, and relegate the right to life of the girl child under Article 21 of the Constitution, to a mere formality.

96. In view of the above, no case is made out for striking down the proviso to Section 4(3), provisions of Sections 23(1), 23(2) or to read down Section 20 or 30 of the Act. Complete contents of Form ‘F’ are held to be mandatory.”


Dr KK Aggarwal
Padma Shri Awardee
President Elect Confederation of Medical Associations in Asia and Oceania   (CMAAO)
Group Editor-in-Chief IJCP Publications
President Heart Care Foundation of India
Past National President IMA

Friday, March 29, 2019

Hon’ble Delhi High Court directs social restaurant to provide wholesome meals and sanitary napkins to children of 10 orphanages and 10 foster care homes


In a yet another exemplary move, on 27th March, 2019 the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has directed Impresario Entertainment and Hospitality, owner of the ‘SOCIAL’ restaurant chain, to provide wholesome meals to children in ten orphanages and ten foster care homes in Delhi for two years.

The restaurant chain will continue providing one meal per day to the children lodged in these centres until the expenditure incurred by it becomes equal to the punitive costs of Rs 20 lakh imposed on it by the Court.

The owner of the SOCIAL chain will also provide sanitary napkins to adolescent girls at these centres.
The order was passed by a Single Judge Bench of Justice Najmi Waziri in a contempt case filed against Impresario Entertainment.

Luxury accessories and apparel label Hermes International had moved the Delhi High Court after discovering that Impresario Entertainment was violating its trademark, logo etc. Without going into the merits, the case was disposed of after Impresario Entertainment stated that it would not use the Hermes trademark or other intellectual property to its benefit.

Despite this undertaking, Impresario Entertainment’s Goregaon Social in Mumbai displayed a red watch-box with the Hermes logo and the word ‘Herpes’.

Aggrieved by the display, Hermes International moved the High Court. It was submitted that the word ‘Herpes’ was written in the same font style and size as ‘Hermes’. Therefore, an unsuspecting individual would ascribe some affinity to Hermes International, it was stated.

Further noting that the word ‘Herpes’ is associated with a skin disease, it was submitted that the display was in bad taste and reflected poorly on Hermes International.

Impresario Entertainment, on the other hand, argued that the element of humour was part of public life. The display on the red box was a word-play and it never intended any harm, it was submitted.

The owner of SOCIAL vowed to abide by any such terms and conditions that may be imposed on it by the Court, in larger public service. Hermes International also agreed to forego the sum imposed as costs on Impresario Entertainment.

Quantifying the punitive damages in the contempt proceeding at Rs 20 lakh, the Court directed Impresario Entertainment to provide one wholesome meal per day to children in ten orphanages and ten foster care homes in Delhi for two years against this amount.

The meal would be equivalent to a mid-day meal as provided by government schools, the Court said. The Court also directed Impresario Entertainment to file a compliance report every four weeks on the distribution of meals.

As per the order, Impresario Entertainment would also have to install a commercial water purifier at Delhi’s 150-year-old orphanage, Bhachhiyon Ka Ghar.

Additionally, it was also ordered to provide sanitary napkins to girls aged 6 to 18 years at these centres. The napkins would be procured by Impresario Entertainment from a Nagpur-based company which also provides sanitary napkins to the Delhi Government under the Kishori Shakti Yojna.

As a natural corollary to this judgement, the question arises “Why are doctors subject to criminal prosecution?”

To prosecute a doctor for criminal medical negligence, any medical action taken by him/her, should have been done with an intention to harm or with the knowledge that it can cause harm and the patient is not informed about the same.

But, no doctor chooses to become a doctor to harm a patient intentionally as was also observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in Jacob Mathew vs State of Punjab & Anr, which stated: “No sensible professional would intentionally commit an act or omission which would result in loss or injury to the patient as the professional reputation of the person is at stake. A single failure may cost him dear in his career… A medical practitioner faced with an emergency ordinarily tries his best to redeem the patient out of his suffering. He does not gain anything by acting with negligence or by omitting to do an act.” Also, no doctor practices without informed consent.

To err is human and despite all care, errors do happen inadvertently.

Difference of opinion, error of judgment, medical errors and medical accidents are not medical negligence. Experiencing a bad outcome does not always mean medical negligence. This has also been the position of the Supreme Court of India in its various judgements.

Doctors are professionals and are bound by the MCI Code of Ethics Regulations.

If there is a Code of Ethics for doctors, then why should they be charged under Penal Codes?

Justice Waziri is known to hand out punishments with a difference.

Earlier this month, Justice Waziri quashed an FIR against a couple, who had employed a minor for household work, and directed them to plant 100 trees and pay Rs 1.5 lakh to the victim. He also directed two other persons, who were agents and through whom the minor girl was employed at the couple's house, to offer manual labour for plantation and care of the trees (Outlook India).

In February this year, Justice Waziri had ordered 2G case accused - Swan Telecom’s promoter Shahid Balwa, the director of Kusegaon Fruits and Vegetables, Rajeev Agarwal, and three firms, namely Dynamic Realty, DB Realty, and Nihar Constructions - to plant 3,000 trees each in the Delhi’s South Ridge forest area. He also specified that the plants should be indigenous, three and a half years of nursery age and six feet in height. They will also have to submit photographic proofs in the court ensuring plants' good health (Business Today).

Why can’t the medical councils and courts follow suit and award punishments of a similar nature instead to erring doctors?

Why are they still being penalized and punished?

It is now becoming evident that more than the medical or clinical factors, it is the social factors that determine the health outcomes.

Doctors are not just clinicians; they are change agents and act as a catalyst for change and transformation in their patients as well as the community. 

Regulation 8.2 of the MCI Code of ethics clearly states “…If the medical practitioner is found to be guilty of committing professional misconduct, the appropriate Medical Council may award such punishment as deemed necessary or may direct the removal altogether or for a specified period, from the register of the name of the delinquent registered practitioner…”.

(Source: Bar and Bench)


Dr KK Aggarwal
Padma Shri Awardee
President Elect Confederation of Medical Associations in Asia and Oceania   (CMAAO)
Group Editor-in-Chief IJCP Publications
President Heart Care Foundation of India
Past National President IMA

Monday, August 6, 2018

Hon’ble Supreme Court grants relief to doctor couple from arrest under section 304 as anticipated




A few days back, I had written about my views regarding the judgement of the Bombay High Court in the matter titled as “Deepa Sanjeev Pawaskar & Anr. Versus the State of Maharastra, Criminal Anticipatory Bail Application No. 513 of 2018”, where the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay held that prescription without diagnosis and hence resulting into death of the patient amounts to criminal negligence on the part of the doctors and dismissed the anticipatory bail application filed by the two doctors.

This article has been published in India Legal magazine at http://www.indialegallive.com/constitutional-law-news/courts-news/prescription-sans-diagnosis-a-case-of-culpable-neglect-52692. The article is reproduced below:

Prescription sans Diagnosis: A case of culpable neglect

August 5, 2018

The Bombay High Court refused to grant anticipatory bail to a doctor couple, saying they were guilty of criminal negligence in the death of a patient

By Dr KK Aggarwal

The Bombay High Court recently held that prescription without diagnosis, resulting in death, amounts to criminal negligence. In Deepa Sanjeev Pawaskar & Anr versus the State of Maharashtra, the Court dismissed the anticipatory bail plea of two doctors involved in such a case.

In June 2017, the complainant, Dnyanada, visited Dr Sanjiv Pawaskar who diagnosed her as pregnant. Dnyanada used to visit the hospital regularly for check-up. On February 5, 2018, she was admitted to Dr Pawaskar’s hospital with labour pains and the next day delivered a female baby via caesarean. She was discharged on February 9. No post-operative instructions were given.

However, on February 10, she started vomiting. Dr Deepa, wife of Dr Sanjiv Pawaskar, asked Dnyanada’s family to phone her from a chemist shop and she then advised the chemist on which medicines to give them.

By evening, Dnyanada had developed fever and was admitted to hospital. The staff informed her that doctors were not available there. She asked whether she should be taken to another hospital. She was told that was not necessary.

She was treated by two nurses on the instructions of Dr Deepa. At 10.15 pm, one Dr Girish Karmarkar saw the patient and prescribed a tablet, Trazine H. But by 3.45 am, the tip of Dnyanada’s nose and her lips had turned black. At 4 am, the staff called Dr Pawaskar, who asked one Dr Ketkar to visit the hospital. By 4.30 am, Dnyanada was getting fits.

Seeing the poor prognosis, Dr Ketkar shifted the patient in his own car and admitted her in the ICU of Parkar Hospital, where she was kept on the ventilator. At 7 am, she expired. The post-mortem revealed the cause of death to be pulmonary embolism.

The Court has called it criminal negligence, which is defined as “gross negligence so extreme that it is punishable as a crime”. However, culpable negligence is intentional conduct where the accused may not intend to do harm, but which a reasonably prudent man would recognise as involving a strong probability of injury to others. This would be a case of culpable neglect, defined as blameworthy neglect.

An error in diagnosis could be negligence and covered under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The element of criminality is introduced not only by a guilty mind but by the practitioner having run the risk of doing something with recklessness and indifference to the consequences. This negligence or rashness is gross in nature.

In the present case, the patient was directed to be admitted in the absence of doctors and medicines were administered on telephonic instructions. Plus, there was no resident medical officer and no alternative arrangement was made. Dr Karmarkar was called by the staff when the condition of the patient started deteriorating.

Section 304A, IPC, says that whoever causes the death of any person by committing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

However, Section 304 says: “Who-ever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”

The Court has applied Section 304 in this case even when there was an established relationship of the doctors with the patient. Telephonic consults in such situations are normal. The patient was informed that doctors were not available. Missing pulmonary embolism by gynaecologists cannot be termed gross negligence. Section 304 involves either intention or knowledge. There was no knowledge on the part of the doctors that it was a case of embolism. The patient was seen by a doctor in the evening and early morning and it was he who shifted her in his own car to another hospital.

In the US, embolism accounts for 1,00,000 deaths annually and in Europe, 3,00,000 deaths. Among venous thromboembolism-related deaths in Europe, three-quarters are hospital-acquired and one-third sudden and fatal. In this case, even Parkar Hospital did not diagnose the embolism and it was found out only by the post-mortem.

The issue is that in an established patient-doctor relationship, telephonic and telemedicine consultation do not amount to negligence. Doctors should challenge this judgment or the national telemedicine programme, where health workers take instructions from doctors over the telephone, will fail.

In an earlier Supreme Court judgment, too, it was said that telephonic instructions should be avoided unless in an emergency. But these are applicable to new patients where the doctor does not know about the patient.



Following the judgement of the Bombay High Court, the doctor couple, both gynaecologists, had filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India to seek to challenge the order passed by the Bombay High Court, which had denied them anticipatory bail.

The Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre and Justice Uday Umesh Lalit granted them relief from arrest under section 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) of the IPC for criminal negligence. The Supreme Court order read as follows: “…both the petitioners, namely, Deepa Sanjeev Pawaskar and Sanjeev Anant Pawaskar shall not be arrested in connection with Crime No.71 of 2018 registered with Ratnagiri City Police Station.”

The Bench further directed that “both the petitioners shall cooperate in the ongoing investigation in connection with the offence in question and will make themselves available as and when required by the Investigating Officer.”

In granting a stay to the arrest order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has acted in the manner, which we had anticipated it would.

Dr KK Aggarwal
Padma Shri Awardee
Vice President CMAAO
Group Editor-in-Chief IJCP Publications
President Heart Care Foundation of India
Immediate Past National President IMA

Saturday, March 10, 2018

Supreme Court allows ‘living will’



Dr KK Aggarwal
Recipient of Padma Shri

In a landmark judgement delivered today, the Supreme Court of India has allowed an individual to draft a living will specifying that they not be put on life support if they slip into an incurable coma.

The order was passed by a five judge Constitutional bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Dipak Misra and Justices AK Sikri, AM Khanwilkar, DY Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, which said “Human beings have the right to die with dignity.” 

Though the judges gave four separate opinions, all of them were unanimous that a 'Living Will' should be allowed, because an individual should not be allowed to continue suffering in a vegetative state when they don't wish to continue living, and know fully well that they will not revive. The Apex Court has set forth strict guidelines on how to execute the mandate of the living will.

Four terminologies need to be understood in context of this judgement: Advanced directive, living will, health care proxy and DNR.

Advance directive: This is a legal document made when the person is alive and still in possession of decisional capacity about how treatment decisions should be made on her or his behalf if they are no longer able to make decisions for themselves or lose the capacity to make such decisions. Advanced directives are acted upon only when the patient has lost the ability to make decisions for himself. They can be revoked orally or in writing by the patient at any time (so long as he or she has maintained decisional capacity).

Advanced directive is a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPAHC or Health Care Proxy) and living will.

Living will: A living will is a document that summarizes a person’s preferences for future medical care including specific interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), ventilatory support, or enteral feeding. It is a document in which patients give clear instructions about treatment to be administered or state their wishes for end-of-life medical care, when they are no longer able to communicate their decisions. A living will takes effect when the person is terminally ill without chance of recovery, and outlines the desire to withhold heroic measures.

Health care proxy: A health care proxy is a person identified by the patient who will take decision with regard to treatment on his/her behalf in case he/she is incapacitated. Simply put, it can be likened to giving “power of attorney” but for medical decisions.

DNR or Do not resuscitate:  This document applies specifically to cardiopulmonary arrest and not to the current health status, even when the patient becomes progressively more ill. It indicates whether the patient wishes for all efforts to be made to revive him by CPR and to be put on lifesaving ventilator.

The American Heart Association recommends that all patients in cardiac arrest should be resuscitated unless they have a valid DNR order, or in cases where resuscitation is physiologically futile (signs of irreversible death).

A series of workshops and guidelines have discussed end of life choices. It was also discussed at ‘End of Life Care’ CMAAO meeting in Tokyo, Japan in September 2017. Active euthanasia was given a big ‘no’ at this meeting, while with regard to withdrawal of ventilation, two options were suggested: either do not put the patient on ventilator or remove the ventilator.

In its Position Statement on End of Life Care and Advance Care Planning, the American Medical Association (AMA) advocates that advance care planning become part of routine clinical practice so that patients’ wishes and preferences for health care, particularly end of life care, are known and met. AMA further says, “The planning process respects the patient’s right to take an active role in their health care, in an environment of shared decision-making between the patient and doctor. It may involve family members, religious advisors, friends and other people the patient feels should be involved.” However, “an advance directive never takes precedence over the contemporaneous wishes of a patient who has decision-making capacity.”

Advance care planning is also considered a routine part of a person's health care in Australia, which allows competent patients the right to make their own decisions involving the withholding and/or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment

However, the complete judgment needs to be read to fully understand its implications in practice.

In its judgement in Aruna Shanbaug case, the Supreme Court had permitted passive euthanasia for a patient in permanent vegetative state, provided it had the approval of the High Court.

“Hence, even if a decision is taken by the near relatives or doctors or next friend to withdraw life support, such a decision requires approval from the High Court concerned as laid down in Airedale's case (supra). In our opinion, this is even more necessary in our country as we cannot rule out the possibility of mischief being done by relatives or others for inheriting the property of the patient.”

“132. In our opinion, in the case of an incompetent person who is unable to take a decision whether to withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, as parens patriae, which ultimately must take this decision, though, no doubt, the views of the near relatives, next friend and doctors must be given due weight.”

The judgement of the Supreme Court does not answer the question as to who will take the decision to withdraw or remove the ventilator if there is no living will.

The current practice (though not legal) is that all legal heirs sign a document for DNR or withdrawal. 

Dr KK Aggarwal
Padma Shri Awardee
Vice President CMAAO
Group Editor-in-Chief IJCP Publications
President Heart Care Foundation of India
Immediate Past National President IMA